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THE LIVING DEAD: ANENCEPHALY
AND ORGAN DONATION

Legislators are considering whether the anencephalic'
child, though its heart is beating and lungs are breathing,
should be considered "dead" for purposes of organ
transplantation. This is because the common law, in the
opinion of many, renders the wrong result.2 Statutes on the
issue offer little assistance.
Consequently, sympathetic
legislators are drafting proposals which they hope will create

a narrow exception to the current laws so that the
anencephalic neonate may again become a viable source of
donor organs,'

This note will examine the legal and ethical dilemmas
in such organ donation and will examine alternatives including
1. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
2. Under the common law, the anencephalic child is an unsuitable organ donor because
at the time the organs are salvageable, the infant
fails to meet the criteria for
cardiopulmonary death.
See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
See also
PRESIDENTS COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH 135 (G.P.O. 1981).
The courts long ago established the "the cessation of life" was to be
judged primarily by "a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood," in
the words of Black's Law Dictionary. Black's - which is not usually a
leading legal authority - is associated with this "definition" because the
dictionary language was repeated in haec verba in a number of judicial
opinions.
Indeed, this interpretation was reiterated despite the
development of medical techniques that could revive respiration and
circulation in a corpse.
Id.
3. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. Statutes require that death be determined
by "generally accepted medical practices." See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, 12
U.L.A. 312 (Supp. 1989). Due to the unique nature of anencephaly and the problems
attendant with the determination of "brain death" in infants, the anencephalic's organs are too
deteriorated by the time a determination of brain death can be made. See Blakeslee, Law
Thwarts Effort to Donate Infants' Organs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1986, at C1, col. 1.
4. See Committee Report, The Anencephalic Fetus and Newborn as Organ Donors, N.Y.
ST. J. MED., July 1988, at 360, 361 [hereinafter Committee Report]. It is clear from this
Report that such organ donation has not always been problematic. Id. at 361-64. The
Report reveals that anencephalics have frequently been used as a source of donor organs.
Id. at 361. The Report discusses many documented anencephalic transplants for the purpose
of examining the ethical considerations of the surgeons involved in the procedure.
Kantrowitz, the surgeon who performed the very first modern transplant in 1966, used an
anencephalic as a donor source. Id. at 361. Kantrowitz asserted that "anencephalic newborns
were a reasonable choice as donors for babies." Id. at 361.
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an assessment of proposals by California Senator Milton
6
Marks' and New Jersey Assemblyman Walter M.D. Kern, Jr.,
both of which are currently under consideration in their state's
legislatures.

Anencephaly is a gross birth defect which prevents the
formation of the upper hemispheres of the brain, allowing
formation of only the brainstem.7 Consequently, the newborn
5. S. 2018, 1985-86 Leg., 1986 Sess., (Cal. 1986) (subsequently revised and under
consideration currently).
6. N.J. Bill A-963, 40th Leg., 202d Sess., (1988) (introduced pending technical review
by the legislative counsel).
7. See Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant with Anencephaly (Draft), April
12, 1989, (on file at New York Law School Journal of Human Rights) (this document
presents a consensus, limited to medical issues, of organizations of physicians caring for
fetuses and infants with anencephaly). See also D. SMIrm, RECOGNIZABLE PA T-ERNS OF
HUMAN MALFORMATION (1976).
Anencephaly represents a defect in closure at the anterior portion of the
neural groove. The secondary consequences are as follows: (1) the
unfused forebrain develops partially and then tends to degenerate; (2) the
calvarium is incompletely developed; and (3) the facial features and
auricular development are secondarily altered to a variable degree,
including cleft in the palate, frequent abnormality of the cervical
vertebrae, and occasional incomplete development of the anterior
pituitary.
Id at 368. See also R. GOODMAN & R. GORLIN, THE MALFORMED INFANT AND CHILD (1983).
Anencephaly has been classified into two major types: holoacrania, in
which the defect extends through the foramen magnum, and meroacrania,
in which the foramen magnum is not included in the opening. The
cranial vault is absent; only the basal portion of the frontal, parietal, and
occipital bones are present. The CNS [craniorachischisis,total dysraphism]
shows varied pathology depending on the extent of the lesion in the
neurocranium and the gestational age. The cerebral hemispheres and
cerebellum may be rudimentary or absent. The remaining cerebral tissue
is distorted and mixed with an angiomatous stroma. The angioneural
tissues are covered by a membrane. Due to small orbits, the eyeballs
protrude. There are variable alterations in the facial skeleton and the
hard palate is usually malformed. Cleft palate and facial duplication may
be noted in some cases. A number of anencephalics have spinal
retroflexion. Malformations of the limbs, thoracic cage, abdominal wall,
gastrointestinal tract, and genitourinary system are relatively frequent in
anencephaly . . . The clinical features are so characteristic that
anencephaly cannot be confused with other disorders.
Id at 40 (emphasis in original text). See also D. BERSMA, BIRTi DEFECTS COMPENDIUM (2d
ed. 1979).
Clinical Findings: Cranial vault deficient with frontal, parietal and
occipital bones present only in their basal portions. Basal bones are
abnormal with small orbits causing protrusion of eyes. Exposed neural
tissue pervaded by angiomatous stroma filling the open cranial defect,
usually covered by a thin membrane (arachnoid) continuous with
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has no cognitive capability,' but does have cardiopulmonary
functions. The infant is, in effect, a biological human but not
a sentient one.9 Most anencephalics do not survive to birth,"0
but of those that do, the life expectancy is usually not more2
than two days," though a few have lived two months.'
Standard treatment is comfort care. 3 Possibly these infants
could live longer but aggressive treatment is routinely
withheld. 4
surrounding hair-bearing skin. Generally stillborn or short-lived.
Id at 83. See also President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUsTAINING
TREATMENT, 181 (1983) [hereinafter LIFE-SUsTAINING TREATMENT].
The fourth source of permanent unconsciousness is congenital hypoplasia
of the central nervous system (anencephaly).
Various degrees of
hypoplasia and dysplasia are possible and some engender brief vegetative
life without development of any mentation or cognition. Usually such
conditions are apparent because of abnormalities of the cranium at birth.
Sometimes the infant is fairly normal, however, and only the failure to
achieve the usual developmental landmarks or the appearance of other
medical complications leads to detection. Most babies whose anencephaly
precludes development of any consciousness die within a few days of
birth, and none survive for more than a few months. This condition
afflicts one of every 850 births, for an annual incidence of 4000 in the
United States.
Id (footnote omitted).
8. id.
9. See Caplan, Should "FoetusesOr Infants be Utilized as Organ Donors, 1 BIOEThICS
119, 138 (1987) [hereinafter Caplan]. "These [anencephalic infants] cannot be said by any
stretch of the imagination to have had desires wishes, or thoughts . . . [T]here is no
meaningful sense in which anencephalic infants can be said to have any of the properties
associated with interests, self-respect or personal dignity." Id.
10. See Walters & .Ashwal, Organ Prolongation in Anencephalic Infants: Ethical &
Medical Issues, HASINGS CENTER REPORT, Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 19 [hereinafter Walters].
("Although most anencephalic infants are stillborn, between 25 and 45 percent are live
births.')
11. Id at 19, col. 2. Approximately 40, percent ofthese infants who are born alive
survive at least twenty-four hours. Of these survivors, one of three will be living at the end
of the third day and one of twenty will live to at least seven days. Id. (citing Baird and
Sadovinich, Survival in Infants with Anencephaly, 23 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 250 (1988)).
12. Id. at 19, col. 2. See also, Caplan, supra note 9, at 122; Baird & Sadovnick, Survival
in Infants with Anencephaly, 23 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS May 1984 at 268; Botkin, Anencephalic
Infants as Organ Donors, 82 PEDIATRICS Aug. 1988 at 250; Abraham, Anencephalic Donor
Program Somied in Controversy, Am. Med. News, Sept. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter

Stymied].
13. Walters, supra note 10, at 19, col. 3.
14. Id. See also LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 181 (the President's
Commission considers anencephaly as a reason for withholding life sustaining treatment).
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Legal issues arise when the parents of an anencephalic
child wish to donate the infant's organs. This is because the
child fails to meet generally accepted practices for determining
death. 5 The problem is that this donation is a nontherapeutic and non-consensual organ extraction from an
incompetent, and the extraction would have to be performed
before a conclusive determination of '"brain death" could be
made. So framed, there are two broad legal issues. First is
whether parental consent is acceptable when the procedure in
no way benefits the child; 16 and second, because of the
inability to conclusively determine death according to standard
medical practices,17 whether the removal of the child's organs
is child abuse, murder or euthanasia." These issues will be
examined separately after first reviewing the ethical
considerations both supporting and opposing anencephalic
organ donation.
I. THE ETHICAL DEBATE
The reasons supporting anencephalic organ donation19
always begin with the distraught parents wishing to salvage

some good from the tragedy of their anencephalic infant's
15. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
16. Removal of the anencephalic's organs may hasten or proximately cause the child's
death. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
See also infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
17. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
18. See Committee Report, supra note 4, at 364. "[Plublic debate on the use of
anencephalics as organ donors has not yet occurred, and . . . the removal or organs from
such newborns is the proximate cause of death and therefore legally constitutes homicide and
ethically constitutes euthanasia." Id. (quoting R. Cranford, Medical Ethics / Vegetative State,
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Neurology, April 1987, New
York City). See also, Cranford & Roberts, Use of Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors:
Crossing a Threshold, PEDIARIuc BRAIN DRATH AND ORGAN/TISSUE RETRIEVAL 194 (H.
Kaufman ed. 1989) [hereinafter Crossing a Threshold].
19. In addition to the reasons supporting anencephalic organ donation presented, a
number of additional reasons are offered: Anencephalics are permanently unconscious; the
diagnosis can be made with 100% certainty (unlike chronic vegetative state, i.e. permanent
coma); the condition is easily recognizable by parents and others; and, these patients are
truly dying (unlike the chronic vegetative state) because the overwhelming majority do not
survive more than a few days. See Committee Report, supra note 4, at 364.
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birth.2' Anencephalic "Baby Gabrielle's"21 parents wanted to
see that their baby would "touch others and contribute to life
in some meaningful way."''
While permitting the family to donate the anencephalic's
organs helps mitigate their despair, most of all, such a
donation provides the waiting recipients with "the gift of life."'
This is sometimes referred to as the beneficence24 rationale
and is the most fundamental reason supporting anencephalic
organ donation.
Anencephalic organ donation has only become an issue
because medical technology has progressed far enough to
provide hope for an infant born in need of a heart, liver, or
kidney transplant.2' However, there is a severe shortage of
infant size organs.26 This shortage is more severe than it is
for children and adults.' Due to this shortage, most of these
20. See Harrison, Organ Procurementfor Children: The Anencephalic Fetus as Donor, 2
LANCET 1383 (1986) ("to salvage from their tragedy the consolation that their loss can provide
life to another child." Id. at 1385.); See generally Landwirth, Should Anencephalic Infants Be
Used As Organ Donors?, 82 PEDIATRICS, Aug. 1988 at 257, 258 [hereinafter Landwirth].
21. See Scott, Death Unto Life: Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors, 74 VA. L. REV.
1527 (1988) [hereinafter Death Unto Life]; See Committee Report, supra note 4, at 360; Annas,
From Canada with Love, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors, HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT, Dec. 1987, at 36, 38 [hereinafter Annas].
22. Baby Without Brain Kept Alive to Give Heart, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1987, at Al, col.
4, Al, col. 6 (quoting Dr. Tim Frewen, Chief of Pediatrics at Children's Hospital'in London,
Ontario).
23. See Walters, supra note 10, at 19, col. 2. Theoretically, a single anencephalic infant
with healthy thoracic and abdominal organs could supply vital organs to save the lives of two
other infants (one needing a heart and another a liver) and enhance the lives of several others
(who need kidneys, corneas, and various transplantable tissues). Id.
24. Landwirth, supra note 20, at 258; see also T. BEAUC-AMP & L. WALTERS,
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BioEmics 28 (2d ed. 1982).
25. Landwirth, supra note 20; Capron, Anencephalic Donors; Separate the Dead From
the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Feb. 1987, at 5; see Botkin, supra note 12, at 250.
'26. See Committee Report, supra note 4, at 360. The need for small organs is
considerable. In the United States, approximately 300 to 500 children die annually of end
stage renal disease and about 400 to 800 die at birth or shortly thereafter of certain forms
of congenital heart disease. Id. See also Botkin, supra note 12, at 250.
27. See Caplan, supra note 9, at 120.
The shortage of organs and tissues available from human sources for
infants is far more severe than the serious shortfall that exists for children
and adults. The small size of newborns means that, for-the most part,
only organs from other infants can be used for transplantation. The gap
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potential recipient infants do not survive. 2 Assemblyman
Kern's statement of purpose for Assembly Bill No. 963
expresses the problem:
Organ transplantation is now being
extended to the very youngest patients, including
newborns, but the shortage of donor organs is
placing severe constraints on transplantation.
Although the demand for infant organs is
potentially large, the supply is virtually nil. Each
year, according to one estimate, some 400 to 500
infants need new kidneys, while about 400 to 500
need hearts, and between 500 and 1,000 need
livers.
Anencephalic infants are a potentially
valuable source of human organs; it is estimated
that about 3,500 such infants are born in this
country each year. Although these infants
constitute a potentially large supply of newborn
organs, the laws of the various states do not
currently permit these infants to be used as
donors, even when their parents insist on such
donation.'
This reason is especially compelling to the parents of the
anencephalic because they feel they can help alleviate the
suffering of others.
between supply and demand is likely to grow greater in the years to come
as transplantation techniques for infants are perfected ....
While infant donors have been found for some children with fatal
congenital heart defects, there are very few such donors available. The
pool of potential donors consists almost exclusively of those who have
died as a result of child abuse, those born asphyxiated and who are, as
a result, brain dead, or those children who suffer sudden infants death
syndrome (SIDS) in a neonatal surgery.

Id (citations omitted).
28. Harrison, supra note 19, at 1383, col. 1.
29. NJ. Bill A-963, 40th Leg., 202d Sess., (1988) (statement of purpose) (introduced
pending technical review by the legislative counsel).
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Further supporting anencephalic organ donation are
scientifically oriented arguments: Anencephalic infants have
an utterly hopeless prognosis.'
They are permanently
unconscious and terminally ill, and their diagnosis can be easily
established both in utero and at birth with an extraordinarily
high degree of certainty.31
Because these infants are
permanently unconscious and can experience no pain or
suffering, hence can never be aware of what happens to them,
they have no interest in treatment, i.e., treatment can neither
benefit nor harm them.32
It is further argued that very little is known about the
immune system of very young children, so the potential
benefits from the research and development of transplant
procedures in the young could further knowledge regarding all
transplantation.33 Moreover, the failure to pursue infant organ
donation will mean that either transplantation will not be
available to many infants and adults, or that researchers will
be forced to rely on primates'M (e.g. Baby Fae's heart from a
baboon donor) as the source for transplantable organs.35
The most widely contended argument against
anencephalic organ donation' is the "slippery slope" scenario.
30. See Crossing a Threshold, supra note 8, at 193.

31. Id
32. Id
33. See Caplan, supra note 9, at 125.

34. See Fletcher, Robertson & Harrison, Primates and Anencephalics as Sources for
Pediatric Organ Transplants, 1 FETAL THERAPY 150 (1986). Cross species transplants is
properly referred to as a "Aenograft." Xenograft has been defined as: n. [xeno + graft] A
transplant from one species to another, sometimes used to indicate a wider genetic or species
disparity than in a heterograft. DORLANDS ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTONARY 1477 (26th

ed. 1985).
35. See Caplan, supra note 9, at 127.

36. In addition to the reasons discussed in the text, a number of less convincing though
defensible arguments have been presented. See Caplan, supra note 9, at 127. Organ donation

from an anencephalic may encourage abortion since the enactment of laws permitting
termination of life based upon brain absence might legitimize the destruction of fetuses prior
to the time at which they possess brain activity. Id. at 135.

Organ donation is extremely

expensive, so the shortage of organs is a blessing rather than a burden. Id. at 139. By saving
the money which would be required for one infant heart transplant, perhaps several others

could benefit from the medical dollars spent. Id at 139-40.
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This argument contends that if organ removal is permitted

from the anencephalic infant, undoubtedly the most vulnerable
human being, then what is to stop the extension of this
practice to the permanently comatose or those with other
terminal conditions?3 7 Furthermore, because of the tremendous
need which exists for all organs, including child, adult, and
infant, societal pressures may come to bear upon organ
donation thus compelling an expansion of any existing
legislation permitting anencephalic donation to further include
other categories of incompetents.'
Those who oppose anencephalic organ donation see a
potential threat to the parents of the anencephalic infant. 9
Anencephaly is usually diagnosed in utero.4' Opponents point
out that societal pressures may come to bear upon the parents
of the anencephalic thereby coercing them in to carrying an
anencephalic fetus to term rather than pursuing the abortion
37. See S0,mied, supra note 12, at 10, col. 2.
38. See Arras & Shinnar, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: A Critique, 259 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 2284 (1988) [hereinafter Arras]. (Authors argue that current principles of
the strict definition of brain death are sound public policy and good ethics and conclude
that admirable goals should not be advanced by improper means. Id. at 2285).
39. See, eg., Annas, supra note 21, at 38, col. 1.
40. Shewmon, Anencephaly: Selected Medical Aspects, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Oct.Nov. 1988, at 11.
[Anencephaly] is, of course, drastically reduced in areas with active
prenatal screening programs. Either ultrasound or maternal serum
alphafetoprotein (MSAFP) measurements will identify nearly all
anencephalic fetuses tested during the second trimester. Experience here,
as in other countries with well-developed screening programs, indicates
that the vast majority of detected anencephalic fetuses are electively
aborted.
Id. at 12. See also Botkin, supra, note 12, at 251. "The greater use of maternal a-fetoprotein
screening in the near future may have a substantial effect on the prevalence of anencephaly
at delivery." Id Large scale screening of pregnant women has been shown to have a
sensitivity or 80% to 100% for the detection of anencephaly when combined with
ultrasonography. Id. See also Thom, The Impact of Maternal Serum Alpha fetoprotein
Screening on Open Neural Tube Defect Births in North-East Scotland, PRENATAL DtAGNOSIS,
Jan. 1985, at 15; Milunsky, Harvesting Organs for TransplantationFrom Dying Anencephalic
Infants, 82 PEDIATRICS, Aug. 1988, at 274, 275 (citation omitted); Chevernak, Isaacson &
Mahoney, Advances in the Diagnosisof Fetal Defects, 315 N. ENGL. J. MED. 305 (1986).
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They further argue that once a parent has been so

coerced, if the fetus fails to survive to term, or otherwise fails
to become a donor, then the parent's tragedy is compounded
further. 2
Fundamentally, it is argued that anencephalic organ
donation violates basic ethical precepts expounded upon by
Immanuel Kant who wrote that humans are an end in
themselves and therefore should never be used as merely a

means to an end.43 As "ends in themselves," Kant believed

that persons have an intrinsic worth that cannot be reduced
to their instrumental value to others." "Act so as to treat

humanity, whether in your own person, or in that of another,
always as an end and never as a means only."'4' The question
is whether prolonging the anencephalic infant's life by artificial
life support and then extracting the vital organs is compatible
with the minimum respect due to all persons.46
Opponents, as well as some proponents are concerned
41. See Chevernak, Farley, Walters, Hobbins & Mahoney, Wen is Termination of
PregnancyDuring the Third Trimester Morally Justifiable?,310 N. ENGL J. MED. 501 (1983).
Anencephaly is grounds for third trimester abortions and such procedures are performed in
the United States. Id at 501. The authors argue that such abortions are morally justifiable
because first, the fetus is afflicted with a condition which is either incompatible with postnatal
survival for more than a few weeks or characterized by the total or virtual absence of
cognitive function, and second, highly reliable diagnostic procedures are available for prenatal
determinion. Id.
42. See Annas, supra note 20, at 38 col 1. The majority of ancephalic fetuses are
stillborn. Their organs are not transplantable. Id.
43. See Arras, supra note 38, at 2284, col. 2.
44. Id Kant's reasoning may be countered with this argument: if the anencephalic
could (miraculously) reflect on his plight, he would consent to organ donation, because losing
vital organs would not deprive him of anything he would desire. Id
45. I. KANT, Foundationsof the Metaphysics of Morals 47 (1785) (Lewis White Beck
trans. 1959). See Somied, supra note 12, at 10, col 4. Dr. Tomasine Kushner, PhD. with
the University of California at Berkeley, contends that organs should be taken from the
anencephalic before primates because "[alnencephalics do not have the same moral claim as
any creature with cognitive awareness, be it a baboon or anything else." Id. This reasoning
is based on the fact that anencephalic can never be self-aware individuals with a "biography."
Id. Alexander Capron, professor of law, medicine and public policy at the University of Los
Angeles argues by saying that "we have different duties to humans that we do to other
species." Id. But see Redmon, How Children Can Be Respected as "Ends" Yet Still Be Used as
Subjects in Non-Therapeutic Research, 12 J. MED. ETIcs 77 (1986).
46. See Arras, supra note 38, at 2284, col. 2.
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that amending the laws on organ donation to include organs
removed from anencephalic babies might undermine the
public's support for and confidence in organ transplantation:
The prospect of taking organs or tissues from a
human being who is breathing and performing
other bodily functions without mechanical
assistance would be repugnant to many both
within and outside the medical community. Such
activity, even if done with the full consent of
parents, might totally undermine the public's
faith and trust in organ procurement and those
47
who engage in it.
While society overwhelmingly supports organ donation and
transplantation, 48 this support and confidence could vanish if
society perceived any abuse.
There is no easy answer to the ethical dilemma
presented in shortening the anencephalic's life, no matter how
short the life expectancy and no matter how absent its
awareness. To many, the question can be decided by a
balancing of the benefits approach.
In balancing the
detriment to the anencephalic who will live only a few days
and live without any cognizance of its existence, against the
benefit to the organ recipient (a full life expectancy), to the
anencephalic's parents (beneficence mitigating the tragedy),
47. See Caplan, supra note 9, at 137.
48. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gir ACr, 8A U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1987).
PREFATORY NOTE
A 1985 Gallup Poll commissioned by the American Council on
Transplantation reported that 93 percent of Americans surveyed knew about organ
transplantation and, of these, 75 percent approved of the concept of organ donation.
Although a large majority approves of organ donation, only 27 percent indicate that
they would be very likely to donate their own organs, and only 17 percent have
actually completed donor cards. Of those who were very likely to donate, nearly
half have not told family members of their wish, even though family permission is
usually requested before an organ is removed. (Report of the Task Force on Organ
Transplantation pursuant to the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act-P. L. 98-507"Organ Transplantation:Issues and Recommendations" (April, 1986)).
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and to society (through advancement of medical procedures
and understanding), proponents view the donation by the
parents as acceptable even in light of the Kantian argument
which squarely rejects the balancing approach.49 There is
clearly no tangible benefit to the anencephalic donor." The
benefit is for the recipient, the parents', and society.
H.

THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Consent and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
Under the common law, no one could consent to the
disposition or use of their body after death." The courts
considered a corpse to be "res nullius" (no one's property) or
"res extra commercio" (property that cannot be bought or
sold). 2 Later developments in the common law responded to
the use of cadavers obtained principally from autopsied and
unclaimed bodies which were needed for research and
teaching. 3 In the mid-1950s the use of cadaver parts and
organs became feasible for transplantation, but due to gaps in
the common law, and varying and incomplete statutory
provisions, hospitals and physicians found it extremely difficult
49. See Arras, supra note 38, at 2284, col. 2.
50. But see Arras, supra note 38, at 2284, col. 2.
One response to this objection is to claim that if the anencephalic infant
could (miraculously) reflect on his plight, he would consent to organ
donation, since losing vital organs would not deprive him of anything he
would desire. Similar argument can be made using the social contract
theory of Rawls, in which the decision maker is unbiased because he does
not know what role (parent, recipient, anencephalic infant, or physician)
he would have in the societal drama and therefore tries to minimize the
worst outcome, which may be a person in need of an organ with no
available donor.
Id.
51. See D. Myers, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING, §17:4, at 520
(1981) [hereinafter DEATH AND DYING] ("[p]art of the reluctance to recognize any property
right in the dead body undoubtedly stemmed from fears that to do otherwise might encourage
a scurrilous trade in dead body parts.") Id.
52. See id
53. Cotton & Sandier, Regulation of Organ Procurementand Transplantation,7 J. LEGAL
MED. 55, 59 (1986).
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to determine whether they could remove an organ without
subjecting themselves to criminal and/or civil liability.54 As a
result of these difficulties, in 1968 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) formulated
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) which was adopted
by all jurisdictions by 1972. 5
The UAGA sets forth who may make a gift of bodily
parts for purposes of organ transplant. 6 Where the decedent
has not, to the knowledge of the relatives, expressed a
contrary intention, the surviving relatives, in the following
order, may make a gift of the decedent's body parts: (1)
spouse, (2) adult child, (3) parent, (4) adult brother or sister,
(5) guardian of the person, (6) any other person authorized or
under obligation to dispose of the dead body. Therefore,
under the UAGA, if the anencephalic child is dead, the
parents would be entitled to make the gift. A problem
remains, however, in that the Uniform Determination of
Death Act (UDDA) defines death as "[e]ither (1) irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2)
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain stem,"
and that the determination of death be made in accordance
with accepted medical standards.57 As will be discussed, no
accepted medical practices have been established which
specifically pertain to anencephalia.

54. Id at 59.
55. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Giwr Acr §§ 1-17, 8A U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1987).

56. Id at § 2, 8A U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1987).
57. UNIF. DETERMINATON OF DEATH ACT, § 1, 12 U.L.A. 293 (Supp. 1989).
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M.

CONSENT OF MINORS (INCOMPETENTS)

To

MEDICAL TREATMENT

Parental consent is required before performing medical

treatment on minors or incompetents.5" The President's
Commission, in discussing medical care of the incompetent or
minor wrote:

9

First, there is a presumption, strong but
rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate
decision-makers for their infants.' Traditional
law concerning the family, buttressed by the
emerging constitutional right of privacy, protects
a substantial range of discretion for parents.6
58. Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n., 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (in dicta the Court said,
"[i]n broad outline, state law vests decisional responsibility in the parents in the first instance,
subject to review in exceptional cases by the State acting as parens patriae." Id. at 627). See
Allen v. Roark, 625 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.Ct. App. 1981) (Since an infant obviously is not able
to evaluate information as to his condition or to consent to treatment, the privilege and right
to receive and act upon that information belongs to the parents. Id. at 416); See also
Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484
P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
59. See LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 212-13.
60. Id at 212 n.62.
The common law antecedents of this presumption are largely to be found
in a notion of paternal (and later parental) supremacy in family matters
and in the corollary that children had few, if any, rights as persons, being
regarded in law as chattels. These antecedents are now largely
discredited and rejected, and have been supplanted by a tempered right
of parental autonomy. This right has gradually developed under a
constitutional aegis in this century, guided largely by principles of
religious freedom and due process until the 1960s.
Id. (Footnote in original, author's note follows). See, e.g, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (right to raise a child); Prince v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents' right
to control education of their child); Cf., Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parental
authority to have child [distribute] religious literature circumscribed). More recently, the
theory began to be influenced by, and not assimilated to, the developing constitutional right
of privacy. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parents' right to direct
religious upbringing of children).
61. LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,supranote 7, at 212 n.63.

Familial privacy has received increasing protection from law throughout
this century. In the earlier stages of legal development, the source of this
protection was sometimes found in the constitutional right of religious
freedom; it has gradually evolved into a more secular protection generally
referred to as the right of privacy. The substantive core includes the
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Second, as persons unable to protect themselves,
infants fall under the parenspatriaepower of the
state. In the exercise of this authority, the state
not only punishes parents whose conduct has
amounted to abuse or neglect of their children
but may also supervene parental decisions before
they become operative to ensure that the choices
made are not so detrimental to a child's interest
as to amount to neglect or abuse.
Plainly, these two legal doctrines - respect
for parental discretion and protection of children
against harm - pull in opposite directions and it
is often difficult to know how to reconcile them
in a particular case. These difficulties may
partially account for the dispute over what
constitutes "neglect and abuse." The meaning of
these terms has varied over time and has rarely
been the subject of careful legislative definition
in statutes. Yet although the standards remain
vague even in the medical arena, as long as
parents choose from professionally accepted
treatment options the choice is rarely reviewed
in court and even less frequently supervened.62
authority of parents to establish family values, to set goals for the family
and for its individual members, and to make decisions affecting the
welfare of family members free from interference by agencies of the
state. For example, although the law requires that children go to school,
parents can generally choose the school. Parents must provide adequate
food and shelter, but they need not conform to the opinions of others as
to the best food or the most appealing shelter. The society as a whole
benefits from promoting diversity, and privacy law has played an
increasing role in protecting diverse life-styles and values.

Id
62. LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 213 n.66.
Generally, when the medical treatment at issue for a minor child is for
a disease or condition that is not severe or life-threatening, courts will
accede to parental wishes not to treat even when physicians disagree.

The courts have been particularly reluctant to order treatment when it
is possible to delay the decision until the child reaches the age of
majority. See, e.g., In re Sieferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955)
(surgery not ordered for 14-year-old boy with cleft palate); In re Green,
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It is precisely this parens patriae power of the state that gives
the opponents of anencephalic organ donation the power of
the state to prevent the organ donation.

Because the

donation is not for the interests of the child, the extraction
can be viewed, at least, as abuse and at worst, murder.
A. Consent of Minor to Organ Removal
Once transplantation became a medical possibility, the

courts were presented with questions as to whether an organ
could be removed from a living donor who was unable to
consent because of incapacity or age.63 While, as discussed
above, the parents are the most suitable to make this decision,
the primary consideration of the courts (in protecting the
state's interest) has been whether the treatment is for the
benefit of the child." Although organ removal, even non-vital
organ removal, can never, without more, be for the benefit of
the donor, courts have upheld such donation where a

Id.

220 Pa. Super. Ct. 191, 286 A.2d 681 (1971) (surgery to correct spinal
curvature). Likewise, even when the consequences of foregoing treatment
may be grave, courts have refused to order treatment where parents have
had well-grounded concerns that the risks outweigh the possible benefits.
In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (1912) (treatment for rickets may
have been more dangerous than the disease). In re Hudson, 13 Wash.
2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (surgery for greatly enlarged and useless
arm with "gross possibility of fatality"). But see, In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d
900, 279 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (over parental objection,
court ordered surgery for 15-year-old boy with neurofibromatosis whom
the court described as grotesque and repulsive), criticized in Goldstein,
Medical Care for the Child at Risk. On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, WHO SPEAKs FOR THE CHILD 153, 180-84 (W. Gaylin & R.
Macklin eds. 1982).

63. See DEAT AND DYING, supra note 51, § 6.1, at 99.
64. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (1941) The primary consideration in all cases
considering medical treatment for minors without parental consent seems to be whether or
not the treatment is for the benefit of the child, to preserve his life or health. Id. at 123.
Skin grafts from child, without parental consent, were grounds for damages. Id. at 123. See
also Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (1932) (blood tests and transfusions from minor
without parental consent was grounds for damages to the parents).
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"psychological benefit" would be gained."'

B. Brain Death
Because modern technology has given doctors the ability
to artificially maintain the heart and lung functions of the
patient whose brain has become irreparably damaged, the
traditional criterion for establishing death become less
adequate.' In a highly influential publication, the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death67 stated:
[o]ur primary purpose is to define irreversible
coma as a new criterion for death. There are
two reasons why there is need for a definition:
(1) Improvements in resuscitative and supportive
measures have led to increased efforts to save
those who are desperately injured. Sometimes
these efforts have only partial success so that the
result is an individual whose heart continues to
beat but whose brain is irreversibly damaged..
. (2) Obsolete criteria for the definition of death
can lead to controversy in obtaining organs for
transplantation.(8
65. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (parental petition for
removal of one kidney from incompetent son for the benefit of his brother granted because
of the psychological benefit to the incompetent); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (kidney removal permitted where the psychological benefit to the incompetent
who enjoyed a dependent relationship with brother was sufficient to warrant the procedure).
66. See D-ATH AND DYING, supra note 51, § 3:4, at 22.
67. Special Communication, Report of the Ad Hoc Committe of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.
Am. MEDICAL Ass'N 85 (1968).
68. Id.
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Brain death soon became the acceptable standard for
determination. 9 By 1981, in a joint recommendation by the
American Medical Association,"
the American Bar
Association, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 71 most states,72 and the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 73 have endorsed the
69. See Defining Death, supra note 2, at 162-63.
The Criteria for Determination of [Brain] Death:
1. CESSATION IS RECOGNIZED WHEN EVALUATION DISCLOSES
FINDINGS OF a AND b:
a. CEREBRAL FUNCTIONS ARE ABSENT, AND ...
There must be a deep coma, that is, cerebral unreceptivity and
unresponsivity.
Medical circumstances may require the use of
confirmatory studies such as EEG or blood flow study.
b. BRAINSTEM FUNCTIONS ARE ABSENT.
Reliable testing of brainstem reflexes requires a perceptive and
experienced Physician using adequate stimuli. Pupillary light, corneal,
oculocephalic, oculovestibular, oropharyngeal, and respiratory (apnea)
reflexes should be tested. When these reflexes cannot be adequately
assessed, confirmatory tests are recommenced.
Adequate testing for apnea is very important. An accepted method is
ventilation with pure oxygen or an oxygen and carbon dioxide mixture for
ten minutes before withdrawal of the ventilator, followed by passive flow
of oxygen. (This procedure allows PaCO 2 to rise without hazardous
hypoxia.) Hypercarbia adequately stimulates respiratory effort within
thirty seconds with PaCO 2 is greater the 60 mmHg. A ten minute period
of apnea is usually sufficient to attain the level of hypercarbia. Testing
of arterial blood gases can be used to confirm this level. Spontaneous
breathing efforts indicate that part of the brainstem is functioning.
Peripheral nervous system activity and spinal cord reflexes may persist
after death. True decerebrate or decorticate posturing or seizures are
inconsistent with the diagnosis of death.
Id.
70. See Guidelinesfor the Determination of Death, 246 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2184, 2186
(1981).
71. The UNIF. BRAIN DEATH Acr (UBDA), 12 U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 1989), was adopted
in 1978 and is currently enacted in only two states, Alabama and West Virginia. However,
this Act was superseded in 1980 by the UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr (UDDA), 12
U.L.A. 312 (Supp. 1989).
72. THE UNIF. DE TRMINATION OF DEATH AcT (UDDA), 12 U.L.A. 312 (Supp. 1989),
has been adopted in 24 jurisdictions: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Vermont and Wyoming.
73. See Defining Death, supra note 2, at 160.
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following language which has been codified in the UDDA:74
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2)
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brainstem, is dead. A determination of death
must be made in accordance with accepted medical
standards."

IV.

THE DIFFICULTY DETERMINING BRAIN DEATH
IN CHILDREN AND INFANTS

Pronouncement of brain death in children is especially
difficult.76 A Presidential Commission established to study "the
ethical and legal implications of the matter of defining death" 17
described the problem: "The brains of infants and young
children have increased resistance to damage and may recover
substantial functions even after exhibiting unresponsiveness on
neurological examination for longer periods than do adults.
Physicians should be particularly cautious in applying
neurologic criteria to determine death in children younger
than five years."78
In an effort to establish "brain death" criteria for
younger children, a Special Task Force was convened to
74. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr, 12 U.L.A. 312 (Supp. 1989).
75. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, 12 U.L.A. 312 (Supp. 1989). West Virginia
has omitted "including the brain stem." UNIF. BRAIN DEATH AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 17 (Supp.
1989). Therefore, in West Virginia, an anencephalic could be considered "dead" at least for
purposes of organ transplantation. Id.
76. See Caplan, supra note 9, at 121; see also Annas, supra note 21 at 37; Volpe,
Commentary; Brain Death Determination in the Newborn, 80 PEDIATRICS, Aug. 1987, at 293.
77. See Defining Death, supra note 2, at 1. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1802 (1978) (enabling
legislation).

78. Special Communication, Report of the Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of
Death to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and

Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Guidelines for the Determination of Death, 246 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 2184, 2186 (1981). See Defining Death, supra note 2, at 166.
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establish acceptable criteria for brain death in children.79 The
criteria, however, are inapplicable to children less than one
week old.8° Further exacerbating the problem is that the
process of dying adversely affects' the tissue in a child more
than it does in an adult.
Therefore, by the time a
determination of death by cessation of cardiorespiratory
functions occurs, an infant's organs would no longer be
suitable for transplantation."1
A. The Brain-Death Standard and the Anencephalic
Many commentators question whether a brain death
standard is even applicable to the anencephalic because of the
absence of a brain. 2 It is argued that new criteria should be
established for the determination of death as to anencephalics,
such as when the body's major organ system stops functioning
in an organized fashion. 3 Noted ethicist Dr. Caplan said "I
am unwilling to have public policy that does not let anyone
under seven days die. With anencephalics, you can't insist on
measuring [the brain's] function because the [brain] isn't
there."'
Others consider whether there is any moral significance
to the UDDA's requirement of "irreversible cessation of...
the brainstem." 5 They reason that anencephalic newborns
have been selected as possible donors because they lack
higher brain structures and the condition is uniformly fatal
79. See Task Force on Brain Death Determination in Children, Guidelines for the
Determinationof Brain Death in Children, 80 PEDIATRICS, Aug. 1987, at 298. The Task Force
reported "[t]here are no unique legal issues in determining brain death in children as
compared with adults. The unique issues are all medical ones and related directly to the
more difficult tasks of confirming brain death in young children." Id.

80.
81.
function,
82.
83.
84.

Id.
See Death Unto Life supra note 21 at 1536. "Without . . . cardiopulmonary
the anencephalic infant's organs lose viability ....... Id
See Styied, supra note 12, at 10, col. 4.
Id.
Id.

85. See Botkin, supra, note 12, at 252.
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within a short period of time.86 The question becomes what
is the moral significance of whole brain death versus the
absence of higher brain function? (i.e. What is the significance
afforded to brainstem activity?)87 The answer given is:
Brainstem activity alone provides a meager
existence. Loss of higher brain functions robs us
of all that makes us human in any sense beyond
that defined by our genetic endowment.
Based on any criteria that require some
level of cognitive function, an argument could be
made that brainstem activity alone has no
intrinsic moral significance. Individuals who have
permanently lost higher brain function have
ended their lives in a biographical sense and are
no longer persons to whom we have duties of
life sustaining support. Any significance afforded
to brainstem activity would be that created by
prognostic uncertainty. There are those rare
cases in which miraculous recovery occurs despite
apparent loss of all higher brain activity. The
anencephalic infant, of course, has no prospect
for recovery. Thus, the brainstem activity in
these infants has no significance,

.

. .

and

these infants are therefore indistinguishable from
brain-dead individuals.'
B. Murder

Because of these difficulties, any gift of the living
anencephalic's organs would at the very least hasten the child's
86. id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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and at worst the donation would be the proximate

cause of death,' breaking the causal chain of anencephaly.91
While organ removal from an anencephalic technically is
murder, no such cases have been reported. 92
Proximate cause arguments, which frequently arise in
criminal cases, 93 can form the basis for a policy permitting
vital organ removal without imposing criminal liability on the
organ removal team.94 Proximate cause arguments occur in
murder trials where defendants have maintained that the
victim of their act was still alive when either the artificial life
supports were turned off or organs were removed. 95 In
discussing the proximate cause theory, the President's
89. Annas, supra note 21, at 36. Most involved with the anencephalic issue believe that
anencephalics are living human beings and that removal of their organs would kill them and
be murder. Id. See Landwirth, supra note 20, at 258 ("[in the view of someJ transplantation
of vital organs from living anencephalic newborns would be both immoral and illegal." Id.).
See also Crossing A Threshold, supra note 18, at 194.
90. See Committee Report, supra note 4, at 364, col. 1. See also CROSSING A
THRESHOLD,

supra note 18, at 194.

91. See Crossing a Threshold, supra note 18, at 194.
Furthermore, removing vital organs such as heart, lungs, liver,
or both kidneys from anencephalic infants is the proximate
cause of death - even though these infants are permanently
unconscious and truly dying . . . There is no medical-moral
consensus concerning the morality of using anencephalics as
organ donors, but the traditional case and statutory law seems
clear - such an action would currently be construed as homicide
... But the fact remains that by any reasonable interpretation,
removing vital organs from living persons - even those who are
permanently unconscious and dying - can only be construed as
directly causing death.
Id
92. Id ("It may be that, as we begin to develop a consensus, and as these cases are
challenged in court, judges and juries will find this is a form of justificable homicide or, if
anencephalic infants are classified as dead or in some other category of neither alive or dead,
it will not be possible to kill something'that is already dead, or not living, or not a person."
Id.).
93. See Johnson v. State, 64 Fla. 321, 59 So. 894 (1912); Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148,
115 N.W. 850 (1908).
94. Defining Death, supra note 2, at 136.
95. DEATH AND DYING, supra note 51, § 17:12, at 533-35 (citing People v. Lyons, No.
56072 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Co. 1974); When Do We Die?, 4 MED. Scl. L. 59 (1964)
(discussing Regina v. Potter (Ct. Crim. App. 1963), an unreported English case)).
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Commission wrote:"
The proximate cause argument relies upon the
well accepted legal principle that a criminal
defendant is liable for the natural consequences
of his act. 7 Even negligent care by physicians
attending the victim of an alleged criminal act
does not relieve the defendant from the
responsibility for the consequences. Thus, even
if the defendants in these cases were correct that
their victims had still been legally alive when
artificial respiratory support systems were
removed, their indictments and convictions would
not thereby be invalid. "The state is only
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant's acts were a substantial factor
in producing the death.""a
While organ removal from an anencephalic accelerates
the actual time of death, anencephaly can still be logically
construed as the proximate cause of the death. Nevertheless,
the question is still open.
V.

SOLUTIONS

Because there is no clear direction as to legality,
proponents very cautiously move forward. They do so by
creating a protocol for dealing with the anencephalic newborn
which they believe comports as closely as possible with
acceptable practices.
96. Defiing Death, supra note 2, at 136.
97. Id. at 136 n.5 (citing Johnson v. State, 64 Fla. 321, 59 So. 894 (1912); Hamblin v.

State, 81 Neb. 148, 115 N.W. 850 (1908)). Thus, only an independent intervening cause of
the ultimate harm can absolve the defendant of guilt. See State v. Smith, 496 So.2d 195, 196
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
98. Id. at 136 n.6 (citing Cranmore v. State, 271 N.W.2d 402, 428 (Wis. App. 1978)).
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A. Canadian Protocol
The Canadian team which made the decision to allow
the donation of Baby Gabrielle's organs established a protocol
which required the parents to agree, prior to birth, that: (1)
the infant will be resuscitated; 99 (2) periodic testing will be
done to determine brain death" (removal from the ventilator
at six to twelve hours intervals for a ten minute period to
determine ability to breathe spontaneously); (3) organ
donation is acceptable;" 1 and (4) a definite time limit (to be
determined by the parents but not more than fourteen days)
after which the infant will be removed from the ventilator and
permitted to die." 2
B. The Loma Linda University's Protocol
In 1986 Loma Linda University Medical Center
(LLUMC) considered a parental request to accept a dying
anencephalic newborn as an organ donor so that another baby
might live.10 3 The group declined concluding that the organ
procurement would be illegal because it would be utilized
before brain death was determined.3 4 The committee formed
to consider the possible use of anencephalic infants as organ
sources, consisted of specialists in neonatology, pediatric
surgery, ethics, child neurology, nursing, administration, and
99. Resuscitation is aggressive life sustaining treatment.
See LIFE-SUSTAINING
supra note 7, at 181-86. This form of treatment is not normally given to the
anencephalic infant for fear that if the treatment gives sufficient strength to the brainstem,
the child might live for a prolonged period. Id. It is widely agreed that to forego such
treatment is the proper course of treatment. Id (discusses the "balancing test" necessary in
continuing treatment for the permanently unconscious patient).
100. One critic claimed that putting Baby Gabrielle on a respirator and feeding her
intravenously rendered the protocol "an elaborate little shell game" used to get around the
ethical difficulties. Baby Without Brain Kept Alive to Give Heart, supra note 21, at B9, col. 2.
101. See Annas, supra note 21, at 37.
102. Id.
103. See Walters, supra note 10, at 22, col. 2 (insert).
104. Id.
REATMENT,
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law.1" 5 The committee produced three drafts of a protocol for
limited respirator use to sustain anencephalic infants until
brain death could be determined.1" However, the protocol
was temporarily tabled for lack of a good answer to the
pivotal question: What assurance is there that an anencephalic
infant attached to a respirator will predictably die within a
reasonable amount of time?"0 7 Commentators stated that "all
discussants showed reticence to contemplate research on these
weakest of human beings.""
On December 18, 1987, the
Medical Center's determination was reported in The Modified
Medical Management of Anencephalic Infants for Organ
Donation:0 9
At the request of anencephalic infants'
parents and after extensive consideration, Loma
University Medical Center has adopted a
modified protocol of medical management that
may provide an opportunity for these infants to
meet organ donation criteria ....
After the diagnosis of anencephaly is
confirmed, the parents should have the
opportunity to decide whether they wish to
donate their infant's organs. If the parents have
made a firm statement that they wish to donate
their infant's organs and have signed consent for
the modified medical management protocol, the
infant will be intubated

.

at birth and

supported with mechanical ventilation
Support to maintain organ viability will be
continued for a preset period of time ... [We]

recommend that a limit to the duration of
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

109. Id. at 23, col. 1.
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intensive care be set prior to the initiation of
mechanical ventilation and that it not exceed one
week.
Examinations for determination of brain
death should be carried out twice daily by a
qualified physician.
Brain death must be
confirmed by two physicians free from conflict of
interest [e.g. they should not be involved in the
direct care of a potential organ recipient]. If
brain death is confirmed, the infant may then be
considered for organ donation. The same
protocol that is used for all organs donations
should be followed for anencephalic infants
meeting brian death criteria . .

.

.A separate

consent should be obtained from the family for
organ donation. The consent should be organ
and institution specific ....
If brain death criteria are not met within
the preset time for intensive care, mechanical
ventilation should be stopped, the infant
extubated, and customary comfort care practices
should be followed, up to the time of death.11°
Modification of Protocol (April 15, 1988):
Upon evaluation of experience with the
original protocol, it is obvious that provision of
full intensive care from birth alters the natural
course of dying, resulting in prolongation of the
dying process.
The' protocol is henceforth
modified for the next six infants in the following
manner: a) the newborns are not to be placed
on respirator support at birth, but only after
cardiac-respiratory failure occurs suggesting
imminent death; b) if brain death has not been
110. Id.
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determined after intensive support for twentyfour hours, mechanical ventilation is withdrawn
and death is allowed to occur without further
intervention; c) if brain death criteria are met
within the twenty-four hours, intensive care is
continued and a confirmation of brain death by
an outside neurologist referee would be sought,
allowing an additional twelve to twenty-four
hours. The infant then is registered as a
potential donor with procurement agencies."'

C. TransplantationPolicy Center; Michigan

In 1986 the state of Michigan established the
Transplant Policy Center to conduct research and examine
issues relevant to the formulation of sound public policy on
transplantation.1 2 The committee taking up the issue of
anencephalic organ donation is comprised of two transplant
surgeons, two transplant coordinators, a transplant social
worker, a nephrologist, an epidemiologist, a neonatologist, a
psychiatrist, a nurse educator, a health policy planner, a
transplant recipient, two philosophers, and two members of
the clergy." 3 In a full report, the Committee analyzed the
three major positions:
(1) that the removal of transplantable organs
from anencephalic infants is impermissible
because they are living human beings, and
attempting to preserve their organs until they are
brain dead treats them as mere means; (2) that
the removal of transplantable organs from
111. Id.
112. Ethics and Social Impact Committee, Transplant Policy Center, Anencephalic
Infants as Sources of TransplantableOrgans,HASTIrGS CENTER REPORT, Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 28.

113. Id.
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anencephalic infants is permissible because under
a revised conception of death - one that would
identify death with total and permanent loss of
consciousness - all such infants are dead; and (3)
that infants born with the top half of their brains
missing are so very different from other living
infants - and their future so radically limited -

that it is permissible, with the fully informed and
freely given consent of the parents, to remove
their organs for transplantation.'
The Committee endorsed the third and stated their Policy
Recommendations:
Anencephalic infants are suitable organ
donors without delay, whatever else may be true
about their status.
The philosophical position

.

.

we

adopt does not reconcile the two above, nor does
it seek to resolve the underlying dilemma
presented by alternative conceptions of brain
death .

.

.

Hence we cannot say with

confidence- whether anencephalic infants should
be thought of as alive or dead.
We are confident, nevertheless, that as a
moral matter, it is right to transplant the organs
of such infants to save lives that can be saved
only in that way, and we believe that it is wrong
to refrain from doing so, if the fully informed
consent of the parents has been given. We
defend not an intermediateposition in the conflict
recounted above, but a position that bypasses that
conflict.
The third position holds that anencephaly
is a condition so special, so very different from
114. Id.
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all others, and one whose diagnosis and prognosis
can be established with such manifest certainty,
that infants in this most unfortunate condition
should be viewed as in a class that is entirely sui
generis and one for which special rules and laws
should apply.11
While this Committee's report is not "law," presumably
it will become the basis for legislation in the state of
Michigan.
D. England. Redefinition of Death

In the United Kingdom, a Working Party of the
Medical Royal Colleges has redefined the determination of
death for the anencephalic infant. 6
They concluded that organs could be removed
from an anencephalic infant after two physicians
(not members of the transplant team) "agreed
that spontaneous respiration has ceased." They
held that while brainstem function tests are used
in adults to determine brain death, such tests are
"inapplicable when the forebrain itself is missing."
Hence, logically, they maintained that, if, in the
adult, brain death plus apnea" 7 is recognized as
death, by analogy, "the absence of the forebrain
in these infants plus apnea would similarly be
recognized as death."
This would allow
115. Id. (emphasis in original text).
116. Milunsky, Harvesting Organsfor Transplantationfrom Dying Anencephalic Infants,
82 PEDIATRICS 274, 275 (1988) [hereinafter Milunsky] (citing Conference of Medical Royal
Colleges and their Faculties in the UK, Report of a Working Party on Organ Transplantation
in Neonates (Department of Health and Social Security, 1988)).
117. Apnea, Apnoea: n. [a-+pnea]. The cessation or suspension of breathing.
STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY 97 (24th ed. 1982).
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harvesting of organs from anencephalic infants
who may exhibit eye movements, pupillary
response to light, spontaneous or induced
movements of the face, limbs, or digits, including
reflex swallowing, and whose corneal, gag, cough,
sucking and rooting reflexes may be present.11
E. Germany: Anencephalics are Never Alive
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the courts accept
the concept that the anencephalic fetus has never been alive
despite the presence of a heartbeat" 9 and allow termination
of pregnancy involving an anencephalic fetus at any time
during gestation. '2 The German investigators responding to
the need for infant organs adopted the court's policy, and in
response to criticisms said: "[b]ecause rapid deterioration
of vital signs makes most anencephalic infants unsuitable as
donors after death

.

.

.

we believe that there are

unfortunately no alternatives at present to intubating,
immediately after birth, the anencephalic infant whose parents
request kidney donation, until the kidneys have been
removed.""
VI.

LEGISLATION

118. Milunsky, supra note 116, at 275.
119. Holzgreve, Kidney Transplantationfon
MED. 960 (1987).

Anencephalic Donors, 317 N.

ENGL. J.

120. Id. at 960-61.
121. See Letter from Rev. K. O'Rourke, Kidney Transplantationfrom Anencephalic
Donors, 317 N. ENOL J. MED. 960 (1987) (The German position that anencephalic infants
may be considered brain dead or that the anencephalic fetus, because of the absence of brain

development, has never been alive is strongly criticized because, the writer argues, "no organs
should be removed until death has been certified on the basis of clinical signs." Id. at 961).

122. Holzgreve, supra note 119, at 961 (reply to Rev. O'Rourke's letter to the editor,
see supra note 121).
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In the United States, California and New Jersey are
involved in legislatively resolving the problem."z Legislation
is difficult because not only is it in derogation of the common
law but statutory expansions of the common law adopted in
all jurisdictions have already been made. Clearly any further
expansion must be very narrowly tailored to the need
otherwise the "slippery slope" could become a reality.
A.

California

123. A narrowly drawn exception to the Uniform Determination of Death Act's whole
brain death standard has recently been proposed by Andrea Scott, Death Unto Life, supra
note 21, at 1565-66:
This amendment, crafted to exempt anencephalic infants from the current
whole-brain death standard of the UDDA, embodies a policy decision
about how best to maintain a supply of viable infant organs. The
amendment would encourage organ donation by providing legal protection
for physicians acting to preserve the lives of potential organ recipients.
Protocols approved by institutional review boards should be used to
provide both procedural safeguards and limited discretion to physicians
acting in accordance with the amendment.
Id. at 1566.
DEFINING DEATH IN ANENCEPHALIC INFANT ORGAN DONORS
An anencephalic infant whose organs are to be used for
transplantation may be declared dead at birth, whether delivered preterm or full term as a result of spontaneous labor or cesarian section, if
the following conditions are met:
(A) Prenatal Diagnosis of Anencephaly
(1) Prenatal diagnosis of anencephaly must be confirmed to a
reasonable medical certainty by no less than three types of diagnostic
testing, including but not limited to sonography, alphafetoprotein testing,
and roentgenography.
(2) Prenatal testing must be performed by no less than three
qualified physicians, including but not limited to an ultrasonographer, a
perinatologist and a geneticist. All physicians performing such testing
must be free from any involvement with all transplantation efforts and
potential organ recipients.
(B) Neonatal Diagnosis of Anencephaly - Neonatal diagnosis of
anencephaly must be confirmed to a reasonable medical certainty by no
less than three qualified physicians, including but not limited to a
neonatologist, a neurologist, and a geneticist. All physicians making the
diagnosis must be free from any involvement with all transplantation
efforts and potential organ recipients.
(C) Consent - Written and informed consent, reflecting a reasonable

comprehension of the meaning and consequences of donation of the body
of an anencephalic infant for organ donation, must be obtained from the
parents of any anencephalic whose organs are to be used for
transplantation.
Id. at 1565-66 (citations ommitted)
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California Senator Milton Marks introduced Senate Bill
2018 in February 1986124 in a direct attempt to solve the
problem. In its original form, the bill provided:
Existing law known as the Uniform
Determination of Death Act provides that an
individual who has sustained either (1)
irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation
of all functions of the entire brain, including the
brain stem, is dead. This act also provides the
manner
for
pronouncement
of death,
confirmation of death of a donor for an
anatomical gift, and the keeping of medical
records.
This bill would revise this definition to
additionally provide that an individual born with
the condition of anencephaly, as defined, is
dead.1 2
"Anencephaly", as used in this chapter,
means markedly defective development of the
brain, together with absence of the bones for the
cranial vault and the cerebral and cerebellar
hemispheres, and with only a rudimentary brain
stem and some traces for basal ganglia present. 26
This bill has been substantially altered so that now a State
Maternal, Child, and Adolescent Health Board would be
established to study the anencephalic issue along with other
related issues:
124. S. 2018, 1985-86 Leg., 1986 Sess., (Cal. 1986) (subsequently revised and under

consideration).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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[t]o review policies and develop
recommendation, as specified relating to
the care and treatment of infants born
with life-threatening illnesses, conditions,
or genetic defects."V
The recommendations made
• shall include the feasibility and necessity
of infant organ transplants, the donation
of organs from infants born with
anencephaly and any necessary changes in
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act."2
While this revised version of the bill does not directly solve
the problem, it does have the benefit of affording a greater
degree of due process to the issue. When an issue is as
sensitive a matter of public policy as this is, this revised
approach may in fact be best. If the benefits of anencephalic
organ donation are determined to outweigh the inherent
dangers, then society can step forward with open eyes into
the situation it has created.
A further improvement in the revision is that the Act
now requests that the State Maternal, Child, and Adolescent
Health Board consider amending the UAGA rather than
amending the UDDA. While the end result in either case is
the same, the problem is that to declare a living, breathing
baby as "dead" under the law defies logic and common sense,
thus could undermine the public confidence in both the
legislature and health care professionals."2 By amending the
UAGA, the benefit lies in bypassing that problem by simply
declaring that the anencephalic infant is suitable for status as
an organ donor.
127. Id.

128. Id.
129. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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B. New Jersey Assembly Bill No. 963
Assemblyman Kern's proposal1" is a direct solution to
the anencephalic organ donor problem. The Bill permits
parental consent for the donation prior to the determination
of brain death by requiring a written request provided that
neither parent objects."'

A parent of an anencephalic infant, either prior
to or upon the birth of that infant, may submit
to the attending physician or surgeon a written
request for the donation of the body of that
infant, or a part thereof, to any of the donees
for any of the purposes stated in section 3 of the
"Uniform Anatomical Gift Act"; to which the
attending physician or surgeon shall consent in
writing if the requested donation is medically
suitable of purpose and safety, and if one of the
parents does not object to the donation,
regardless of whether the infant has sustained an
irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory function or an irreversible cessation
of all functions of the brain stem.
"Anencephalic infant" means a newborn infant
who, as certified in writing by an attending
physician or surgeon, has no skull above the
forehead and no cerebral cortex, and is,
therefore, considered to be "brain absent," which
condition is always fatal and causes the infant to
begin to die the moment that it is born." '32
The benefit of Assemblyman Kern's proposal lies in its
130. NJ. Bill A-963, 40th Leg., 202d Sess., (1988) (introduced pending technical review
by the legislative counsel.).

131. Id.
132. Id.
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expeditious resolution of the dilemma. The benefit, however,
is at the expense of the due process concerns which are so
well advanced in the California proposal. Thus, the New
Jersey bill risks a public backlash. Such a response is
unlikely though, as the benefits are obvious whereas the
detriments are latent.
VII. CONCLUSION

This note's ghoulish title is not an entirely inaccurate
account of the anencephalic's existance. The title is intended,
in part, to give pause to consider a fundamental question
which underlies this dilemma: What does it mean to be a
person? Is it merely being the of human biology, or, is it
something more? Must it include sentience, or, must it
include the full compliment of a human biology, sentience,
and sapience? Kantians answer this question easily and
declare that society owes every duty to the anencephalic as it
owes everyone else. 33 To others, however, the anencephalic's
"brain-absence, "134 renders its existence meaningless, because,
without "personhood''13s and, without an ability to form a
"biography,"" life has no raison d'etre and therefore, society
does not owe the same duties to the anencephalic as it owes
to everyone else.
From the above account, we can see that a consensus
is beginning to form which would permit anencephalic organ
donation. It is hoped that the medical profession will lead
the way as the law should follow the reasonable standards of
133. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
134. See Harrison, supra note 19, at 1383. See also Arras, supra note 38, at 2284.
135. See Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, HASTNGS
CENTER REPORT, Nov. 1972, at 1 (the author suggests, for purposes of biomedical ethics,
fifteen positive propositions and five negative propositions which may explicate humanness or
humaneness, what it means to be a truly human being); see also Stymied, supra note 12, at 10,
col. 4; Arras, supra note 38, at 112.
136. See Stymied, supra note 12, at 10, col 4.
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medical practice.137 If, ultimately, such organ donation is
determined acceptable by the medical profession, then the
most direct next step is contained in Assemblyman Kern's
proposal. Because medical technology has progressed far
enough to give hope to the infant in need of an organ and
because medical technology has not progressed far enough to
give any hope to the anencephalic infant, the New Jersey and
California Bills are appropriate legislation. To deprive the
hopeful child of this opportunity will only assure that there
will be two dead children. One living child is far better than
two children dead. These Bills save lives.
Charles N. Rock
137. See Crossinga Threshold, supra note 18, at 196.

